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1.  Introduction 
 
  The pre-amble of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture calls for reform to be equitable 
"having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the 
environment".  Article 20 calls for an ongoing process of substantial progressive r eductions to 
support and protection while taking into account non-trade concerns.  
 
  Recent papers by Lindland (1998) and Nersten and Prestegard (1998) define non-trade 
concerns in the context of the multifunctional nature of agriculture.  They argue that the concept 
of multifunctionality in agriculture, and hence non-trade concerns, are nothing more than the 
economic concept of positive externalities, and thus should be treated in the same analytical 
framework.  They identify three non-trade concerns associated with agricultural production: 1) 
food security, 2) viability of rural areas, and 3) environmental protection.   These studies state 
that these three non-trade concerns are not only positive externalities, but are also public goods.  
Lindland makes the assertion that economic theory generally recommends that subsidies be used 
to correct for market failures associated with public goods problems.  He further argues that 
“support coupled to the agricultural production, seems to be the most efficient way of ensuring a 
sufficient production level of public goods to the extent that these public goods are joint products 
of the agricultural production” (Lindland pg. 23). 
 
  The opening negotiating positions of the European Union and Japan demand 
consideration of the multifunctional role of agriculture in the next round of negotiations on the 
Agreement on Agriculture.  They argue that Article 20 of the exiting Agreement on Agriculture 
should be expanded to include the multifunctional role of agriculture.  Critics  suggest that the 
reason that Japan and the EU are promoting multifunctionality is to justify continued treatment 
of agriculture as a special case and to foot drag the liberalization process.  This proposal has met 
with strong disagreement by the Cairns Group of agricultural exporting countries and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).  The position put forward by these groups is 
best expressed in an article by Freeman and Roberts (1999) which argues that multifunctionality 
is disguised protectionism. 
 
  Freeman and Roberts agree that concept of multifunctionality is equivalent to the 
economic concept of externalities.  However, they argue that these spillovers involve both 
positive and negative externalities.  Providing agricultural support is a  very indirect and high cost 
way of enhancing spillover benefits.  They advocate specific payments that are targeted at 
providing the multifunctional outcome as a more efficient outcome.  It might be added that 
multifunctionality is a concept that does not just apply to the agricultural sector, but equally 




  To date the arguments against multifunctionality do not address the economic validity of 
the fundamental assertions of its proponents.   This paper attempts to ascertain this validity.  
Section 2 looks at the economic definitions of externalities and public goods, and discusses 
whether the three non-trade concerns identified by Lindland are indeed externalities of 
agriculture production, and whether they are also public goods. Section 3 examines alternative 
mechanisms for correcting for externalities.  The concluding section discusses appropriate 
methods for addressing Lindland’s concerns.   
 
2.  Externalities and Public Goods 
 
What is an Externality?
1  
  At least one hundred years have passed since "external economies" entered economists' 
vocabulary.  The externality concept has been used widely  but no precise and agreed upon 
meaning of the term as yet has emerged and differences in meanings are often fundamental in 
nature (Papandrea p. 13).  One definition is that an externality is a situation where the action of 
one economic agent influences the well being of either another consumer or the production 
possibilities of another producer and no mechanism for compensation exists.   
 
  This definition is very broad.  To be practical some narrowing of the definition is needed.  
Indirect pecuniary interdependencies between economic agents are often excluded from the 
definition because these interdependences are just facets of the proper working of the price 
system.  For example, a technological improvement in one sector may increase production in 
another sector as a result of  cost  savings from lower input prices for the first sector’s product.   
 
  Even when pecuniary interdependencies are excluded from consideration, the resulting 
categorization of what “indirect consequences” qualify to be externalities  is still too broad for 
practical use.     
 
  The working definition can be further narrowed by considering only “relevant 
externalities.” Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) define  “irrelevant externalities” as activities or 
“indirect consequences” for which t he affected agents have no incentive to alter the generators’ 
behaviour.  Buchanan and Stubblebine further subdivide “relevant externalities” into those that 
are “Pareto-relevant” and those that are “Pareto-irrelevant”.  “Pareto-irrelevant” externalities 
refer to situations where one cannot make the agents affected by the externality better off without 
making the generators worse off.   Normally, the government should take steps to correct only 
“Pareto-relevant” externalities.  But, if society for some reason, other than economic, attaches 
                                                                 




2 to the agents affected by a externality than to the generators, then government 
should, in this special case also take steps to correct for the “Pareto-irrelevant” externality.  
  
Is food security an externality? 
  The Lindland paper states that food security is a legitimate national concern in all 
countries, and postulates that the national feeling of well being associated with food security is 
an externality to agricultural production.  In order to determine the validity of this argument it is 
necessary to identify (i) the externality associated with food security, (ii)  the externality 
generating mechanism, and (iii) the relationship of this mechanism to agricultural production.  
The externality associated with food security may be a feeling of national well being associated 
with knowing that there is a secure supply of food or the externality may be related to health 
concerns if a large proportion of a nation’s population does not have a proper diet.  The 
externality generating mechanism most likely is consumption (or some minimal level of 
consumption). Consumption, is related to domestic agriculture production through a supply 
disposition identity that states that consumption may be sourced from domestic production, 
imports, or beginning stocks and that exports and future consumption (ending stocks) reduce the 
amount of food available for domestic consumption.  Only part of the Lindland argument holds.  
The national sense of well being associated with the knowledge of food security is an externality, 
agriculture production is not the externality it is only an activity associated with the externality 
generating mechanism.  Agricultural production is a substitute for  other sources of supply such 
as imports and stocks. 
   
  These external effects of food security are not joint with agriculture production because 
consumption, the externality generating mechanism, is not joint with agriculture production.  
Furthermore the e xternality of food security cannot be joint with production.   Increased 
agriculture production is not sufficient to guarantee food security.  A country also needs 
guaranteed access to agricultural inputs (eg. machinery parts, fuel, fertilizer, etc) and a  secure 
food distribution network. Neither is increased agriculture production the only method to achieve 
food security.  Alternatively, food security can be obtained by guaranteeing secure access to food 
imports and increasing stock holding. 
 
Is Viability of Rural Areas an Externality? 
  Rural viability in some communities is related to agricultural production.  Rural viability 
is some times equated with rural employment.  Employment in this case could be considered to 
be the externality generating mechanism.  Rural employment or the labour supply will be 
distributed between agricultural labour demand and labour demand by other rural enterprises.  
Labour is only one input in agriculture production and competing inputs can be substituted for 
labour as wage rates (or other factor prices) rise or as technology changes.  Agriculture 
                                                                 
2As measured by the social welfare function.  
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production is only associated with rural viability and it is not an externality.  The relationship is 
two steps removed. 
 
  The Lindland paper maintains that culture and traditions are  sometimes deeply rooted in 
rural life and qualities, and that increased social and environmental problems often follow in the 
wake of urbanisation.  However, these aspects are externalities to rural viability and not to 
agricultural production. 
 
  Furthermore, in rural communities, the interdependencies between rural viability and 
agriculture production are through the normal workings of the market.  As such this 
interdependency is only a pecuniary externality.  
 
Is Environmental Protection an Externality? 
  Of the non-trade concerns identified in the Lindland paper, environmental protection is 
the most clearly associated with the traditional externality problem.  But, there are both positive 
and negative environmental externalities arising from agricultural p roduction, and both types 
have to be taken into consideration, and social trade-offs weighed, before correction is made.  
Not only are there both positive and negative environmental externalities arising from agriculture 
production, but a single  environmental externality can change from being positive to negative 
depending upon the intensity of agricultural production.  Consider the externality of landscape 
effects.  To a certain degree, promotion of agriculture production will foster a scenic pastoral 
landscape, but beyond this degree the landscape effect will be lost as large buildings and silos are 
erected, and marginal marsh/forest areas are brought into intensive production.  It has to also be 
remembered that agriculture is not the only generator of environmental externalities in the 
economy.   
 
What is a Public Good? 
  Samuelson (1954 and 1955) introduced a new perspective on externalities in his seminal 
papers on public goods.  Public goods are distinguished from private goods in that the 
consumption o f a public good by any agent cannot affect or subtract from the consumption of 
other agents.  This aspect of public goods is called non-rivalry or nondepletability.  If a good is a 
pure public good, then a second condition will also hold.  This condition i s called non-
excludability, and requires that the consumption of the good by any agent cannot be limited or 
denied.  It is generally recognized that left to its own devices, the market will provide less than 
the socially optimal amount of a public good.  T he reason for this is that each consumer's 
purchase of a public good provides a direct benefit not only to the consumer himself but also to 
every other consumer.  As consumers do not consider these benefits to others in making their 
purchases, and because  their opportunity cost for consuming another unit is zero, the payment 
offered to producers is not sufficient to provide a socially optimal amount of the public good.  In 
addition, the non-excludability aspect of a pure public good creates a situation where consumers  
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can free ride.  Each consumer has an incentive to enjoy the benefits of the public good provided 
by others while providing an insufficient amount himself.  
 
Are all Externalities Public Goods? 
  The term externalities is often used interchangeably with public goods.  But, although all 
public goods are externalities, not all externalities are public goods.  Pure public goods are just a 
special case of  an externality.  Whether an externality is a public good or not depends on whether 
the externality can be described as depletable (rivalrous) or as non-depletable (non-rivalrous).  
Depletable externalities have the feature that the experience of the externality by one agent 
reduces the amount that will be felt by other agents.  Nondepletable externalities have the 
characteristic of public goods in that what is felt by one individual does not affect, and is not 
affected by what is felt by other individuals. 
 
  There are public good aspects to the national well-being externality associated with food 
security, and to the culture, tradition and urban social unrest externalities associated with rural 
viability.  Environmental externalities associated with agriculture production can be either 
depletable or nondepletable.  For instance, pollutants in a stream  can be a depletable externality, 
while an attractive landscape is more likely to be nondepletable. 
 
3.  Alternative Mechanisms for Correcting for Externalities 
 
Is the mere existence of an externality enough to justify government intervention? 
  It is important to distinguish between depletable and non-depletable externalities because 
the appropriate mechanisms for correcting for them differ.  Whereas a market based solution 
sometimes work well for depletable externalities, it very seldom works for nondepletable 
externalities.  
 
  A market solution should be used, where possible, to correct for depletable externalities. 
The necessary conditions
3 for a market solution to work are 1) there is only  a  small number of 
agents  associated with the externality; 2)  the transactions costs of bargaining are minimal; and 
3) property rights can be enforced.  The government’s role in achieving the market solution is 
merely to foster conditions under which the two sets of parties can reach a mutually beneficial 
agreement.  The major advantage to market based solutions is that this approach requires little 
knowledge on the part of the government in order to work.  Private agents, however, must know 
each others preferences and must have equal information.  Information asymmetries between 
agents can confound the market negotiating process.   
 
                                                                 
3  Appendix A describes these necessary conditions in more detail.  
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  In certain cases impure public goods can also be tackled through a quasi-market solution.  
In these circumstances, where exclusion is enforceable
4the impure public good can be optimally 




If the Government must intervene, what are its alternative choices? 
  If a market based solution is not appropriate, governments have two choices.  One choice 
is to indirectly intervene to affect prices, and thereby affect the incentives of the individual 
agents.  This is a preferred option so long as pricing directly affects the incentives to produce the 
externality. The optimal pricing of externalities, both depletable and non-depletable, requires a 
different price to be set for consumers (victims/beneficiaries) of the externality than is set for its 
producers.  This two price system can be created using taxes for negative externalities and 
subsidies for positive externalities.  The government requires a great deal of information in order 
to set optimal tax/subsidy levels.  The optimal solution requires the tax/subsidy to be exactly 
equal to the marginal value of another unit of externality.  This implies that it has to be possible 
to measure the amount of externality being produced, a nd it has to be possible to measure the 
benefits and costs of both the recipients and generators of the externality
6.  
 
  It is essential that the tax/subsidy be applied directly to the externality generating activity, 
and not to associated activities.  For example, in the case of a negative externality, although a 
tax
7 on output would lead the firm to change its level of output, it would not necessarily lead the 
firm to change its behaviour with respect to the externality.  If the incentives are aimed 
appropriately, the firm will try to reduce the amount of negative externality generated per unit of 
output instead of just decreasing output.  Taxing output is only optimal in the very special  case 
where the externality occurs in a fixed proportions relationship with output.  
 
  Likewise with positive externalities, subsidies need to be targeted directly at the 
externality generator.  They should not be coupled with output, but aimed at the particular 
                                                                 
4See the theory of club goods in Cornes and Sandler (1996). 
5 See Bohman et al (1999). 
6Measurement can prove to be a formidable problem.  It is often not technologically feasible to measure the 
amount of externality (particularly in the case of public goods) being produced, and even in cases where it is 
possible to measure, it is often prohibitively expensive to do so. Measurement of the benefits and costs 
associated with public goods can also prove to be very difficult.  In practice the degree to which an agent is 
hurt or benefits from a public good is only known to the agent.  Economic literature is full of instances where 
agents would not have the proper incentives to provide a truthful valuation of externalities.  Although, there are 
a variety of mechanisms to solicit truthful valuations from agents, such as contingent valuation and other 
mechanisms which make truth telling a dominant strategy  (Groves and Clark), they all have problems 
associated with them, and can be prohibitively expensive to carry out.  
7Direct payments should not be given in compensation to victims for negative externalities.  Victims typically 
have a variety of responses they can make to reduce the damages that they suffer.  Compensation weakens or 
destroys victims’ incentives to take defensive action.  In addition to this moral hazard problem, it provides an 
incentive for others to enter into the victims’ activity.  
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activity directly producing the externality.  Implementing subsidies which will not affect output 
is problematic.  The only type of subsidy which will not affect output is a direct payment where 
the recipient can not affect the payment’s size by changing his behaviour.  
 
  The government’s other choice is to directly intervene by either providing the goods 
themselves in the case of positive externalities or by restricting activities in the case of negative 
externalities. Again, for the government intervention to be effective, it has to aim right at the 
generator of the externality, and not at associated activities.  The advantage of the regulatory 
approach is that it can often be targeted more specifically than other interventions.  
 
  In certain cases the regulatory approach can be combined with a partial market based 
approach.  This approach is being used with increasing frequency to address pollution problems.  
For example, quotas are specified for the total acceptable level of pollution, and the rights to the 
use of the quota are then marketed through  tradable externality permits.  Success of this 
approach depends on whether the externality is measurable.  
 
4.  Alternative Solutions to Non-Trade Concerns 
  Three non-trade concerns  - food security, viability of rural areas, and environmental 
protection  - have been identified by the EU and Japan as reasons not to liberalize agricultural 
trade.  As discussed in Section 2, neither food security nor viability of rural areas are, in and of 
themselves, externalities.  However, there are external effects or public goods stemming from 
both food security and viability of rural areas.  Economic theory tells us that any remedial action 
that the government decides to take to bolster production of these positive externalities has to be 
aimed directly at their source and not at an associated activity (which in this case is agriculture 
production).  Agriculture production should only be targeted if it can be shown that there is a one 
to one correspondence between agricultural production and the national feeling of well being 
associated with food security or between agricultural production and the cultural heritage found 
in rural areas. No such relationship exists. 
 
  There are three traditional solutions the government can undertake to correct for 
externalities: the fostering of missing markets, granting of subsidies, and/or direct provision of 
the goods.  The appropriate choice of instrument depends upon a number of factors including the 
availability of information, and t he cost of implementation.  In some circumstances, the goals of 
food security and viability of rural areas can be conflicting.  To the extent these goals are self-
conflicting, different instruments will be needed to achieve them, and society will have to 
determine the appropriate trade-off between them. 
 
  The national feeling of well-being associated with food security can be generated in a 
number of ways: by better informing the public that global food capacity exceeds global food 
demand; through development of secure access of imported production inputs and food supplies  
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to complement competitive domestic sources; and perhaps through public private stock holding.  
Because food security, and the associated feelings of well being, are not joint with agricultural 
production, coupled production subsidies are neither appropriate nor effective interventions. 
 
  The viability of rural areas is seldom, and decreasingly, dependent alone on agricultural 
production.  Where this is the case, this interdependency is a result of a competitive supply 
capacity, and no government intervention is required.  The viability of rural areas can be 
facilitated in a number of ways: through special measures to ensure rural, remote and less 
populated areas are not disadvantaged relative to their more urban or centralized counterparts in 
terms of access to public services and facilities (transportation, communication, education); 
through an on-going review of government policies, programs and services to ensure that there 
are no unintended and negative impacts on rural areas; and perhaps through highly targeted and 
time limited initiatives aimed at mobilizing local resources to exploit sustainable economic 
development opportunities based on a  local competitive capability.  Support for an increasingly 
productive and efficient agricultural sector is not an effective approach to realizing viable rural 
areas, and often works against this realization unless other non-primary agricultural employment 
opportunities are developed.  More efficient  agricultural production usually implies less labour 
input, which in turn implies less populace to support the rural communities.   
 
  There are both positive and negative externalities associated with the environmental 
consequences of agricultural production.  Again, trade-offs between conflicting goals have to be 
determined.  Once the trade-offs are determined, policies need to be designed to address the 
specific problems.  Although there may be a positive correspondence between agricultural 
production and landscape attributes, the correspondence is not one to one, and there is a point 
beyond which this correspondence becomes negative.  This implies that if subsidies are the 
instrument chosen to correct for this landscape externality, they need to be tied to the particular 
attribute of agricultural production that gives the scenic value.   If the scenic value comes from a 
particular technological practice, then any coupled payments should be focussed on this 
technological practice, rather than on output.  If the value comes from just the fact that the land is 
in agricultural employment, then a per unit output subsidy is not needed   An income supplement 
pegged to a certain minimal level of effort, with cross-compliance regulations may be sufficient.  
If bio-diversity is the environmental goal, then it could more effectively be addressed through: 
regulations for protection of habitat, cross compliance regulations linked with direct income 
supplements/tax concessions, and in some cases direct payments could be tied to the number of 
select species of interest located on the farm.    
 
  There is no single appropriate method of government intervention to correct for 
externalities. The appropriate choice of instrument depends on the circumstances under which 
the externality occurs.  Any policy formation exercise must clearly define the objectives, then 
target the instruments to meet the objective.  The instrument must be targeted directly at the  
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externality generator and not at associated activities.  Measurement becomes one of the most 
important determinants in the choice of policy instrument.  Adequate measurement requires both 
defining and valuing the external activity.  The  costs of the corrective mechanism may out 
weigh the benefits from the change in the level of the externality.  If this is the case no action 
should be taken to correct for the externality.   
 
  The method chosen for correcting an externality can create additional externalities.  For 
instance, the coupled agriculture production subsidy, which the L indland paper proposes, itself 
creates pecuniary externalities with the subsidies distorting international markets.   Both positive 
and negative externalities are associated with agricultural production and addressing these 
externalities creates conflicting objectives.  The same instrument cannot be used to address 
conflicting goals, and trade-offs need to be made.  It is important to recognize that not all 
externalities are market failures requiring government intervention. Neither is it good policy to 
maintain an instrument while searching for new objectives to justify its continued use. 
 
  There is a very real concern that a pretence for correction of externalities may become a 
justification for protectionist interventions.  From a practical perspective t here are several 
methods that international agreements might use to limit the abuse of substituting externality 
correcting mechanisms for other trade distorting measures.  A country which wishes to intervene, 
in the interest of correcting for positive externalities could be required to (1) demonstrate the 
existence of the externality and (2) provide measurable evidence that the benefits of correcting 
for the externality exceed the costs (including the costs imposed on international markets) arising 
from the corrective mechanism.  To this end a net benefit approach might be appropriate where a 
country has to demonstrate that for instance the positive externalities of an activity exceed the all 
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Historical Overview of Externalities in the Economic Literature 
 
  The definition for an externality which is most often quoted is that of Meade (1952) "(a)n 
external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an appreciable benefit (inflicts 
appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not fully consenting parties in 
reaching the decision or decisions which lead directly or indirectly to the event in question".  
This is a very broad definition which is not specific about the institutional framework within 
which social interactions take place.  The person or persons may be consumers or producers and 
the interactions may be between consumers, between producers, or between consumers and 
producers. Bator (1958) provided the broadest possible characterization of externalities "any 
situation where Paretian costs and benefits remain  external  to decentralized cost-revenue 
calculations in terms of prices" (1958 p 362).  In effect Bator was equating all market failures 
with externalities. 
 
  Although there is considerable debate as to what should be included as an externality, for 
practical usefulness some narrowing of the definition is needed.  Pecuniary externalities are often 
excluded because they refer to the general equilibrium interdependencies in the economy which 
are just facets of  the proper workings of the price system.  So externalities can not simply be 
general interdependencies in the economy.  Likewise externalities like envy or altruism are 
usually not included in the discussion of market failing externalities. 
 
  A distinction between potentially relevant and irrelevant externalities is needed.  
Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962) define a potentially irrelevant external activity as one for 
which the affected agents have no incentive to alter the generators behaviour.  From the group of 
potentially relevant externalities Buchanan and Stubblebine further classify Pareto-relevant and  -
irrelevant externalities.  They argue that the desire to modify another's behaviour does not 
provide a good rationale for modification unless the ensuing change can be done in such a way 
that the party affected by the externality gains without the acting party being made worse off.  
This is a Pareto-relevant externality. Under this classification an externality includes both 
efficient and in-efficient resource allocations. The policy implication is that government should 
intervene when Pareto-relevant externalities remain after all possible negotiations have taken 
place.  When all the gains from trade have been squeezed out of the situation, by the agents in 
question, there is no reason to intervene 
 
  A market is an institution in which individuals exchange not just commodities, but the 
rights to use them in particular ways for particular lengths of time (Gravel and Rees pp. 503-
504).  These rights which define the uses which the assets may be put are property rights.  
Therefore markets are institutions which organize exchange of control of commodities, where the 
nature of the control is defined by the property rights attached to the commodity.  Prior to 1960 
the examination of externalities had not focussed on the institutional arrangements within which 
transactions took place.  Coase's article "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) represents a turning 




   
  Although it was not Coase's intention to clear up the confusion surrounding the notion of 
externalities (his seminal article did not refer to the word external economy) he did provide a 
framework in which the effects of an externality could be internalized.  If the agent emitting the 
externality and the agents who are affected could negotiate, given an allocation of property rights 
with regard to the externality-generating activity, a socially optimal allocation of the externality 
can be attained.  An efficient allocation of resources is a situation where no further mutually 
advantageous trades are possible.  Mutually advantageous trades will not be possible where the 
transactions costs of the negotiation are prohibitively high and the problem of the externality will 
remain.  The fact that externalities can been seen as inherently tied to the absence of competitive 
markets was originally pointed out by Meade (1952) and substantially extended by Arrow 
(1969).  In this framework an externality arises when the private economy lacks the incentives to 
set up a potential market for the activity in question and the non-existence of the market will 
result in an inefficient allocation of resources. 
 
  Coase has had a lasting impact by centering economists' attention on the costs of 
alternative institutions in organizing economic activity, and the importance of these costs in 
evaluating the efficiency of the system.  The institutional approach which has followed Coase has 
focussed on the formation of these institutions.  The emphasis of this study has been on why the 
institutions have not developed and mutually beneficial exchange has not taken place.  Exchange 
will not take place if individuals do not have effective control over the factor in question, if 
individuals do not have sufficient information to seek out profitable trades, and if individuals 
cannot agree on how to share the gains from mutually beneficial exchange. 
 
  Control over the factor depends on a system of property rights.  The reasons for the lack 
of formation of property rights include: imperfect excludability or non-transferability.  Imperfect 
excludability arises when effective control (i.e. the ability to determine use) of a commodity is 
not conferred on a single individual but rather on a (possibly large) group of individuals.  When 
control is vested in a group, an individual who wishes to acquire control must enter into contracts 
with all the individuals in the group.  This process may be extremely difficult or costly so that no 
one individual can acquire exclusive control.  Factors with this characteristic are described as 
non-exclusive, common property or free access resources and examples include grazing lands, 
fishing grounds, and public parks.  Control may also be defined in terms of the ability to exclude 
individuals.  Exclusion requires devoting resources to detection and punishment.  The cost of 
these resources is known as exclusion costs.  Imperfect excludability results in potentially 
advantageous trades or exchanges not taking place.  Even when exclusion is possible profitable 
exchange may not occur because of non-transferability of the factor. 
 
  Missing markets do not provide a complete description of market failure.  Externalities 
may also not be internalized because of non-convexities in production.  These non-convexities 
are usually associated with increasing returns to scale (Marshall's original concern with external 
economies). Non-convexity can also be associated with transactions costs which obstruct the 
formation of the market.  This type of non-convexity is sometimes associated with substantial 
set-up costs so the private economy would lack the  incentives to form a market.  Heller and 
Starrett (1976:10) assert that an externality is "a situation in which the private economy lacks  
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sufficient incentives to create a potential market in some good and the non-existence of this 
market results in losses in Pareto efficiency".  Although the failure of property rights to be 
developed is an important ingredient of many externality situations this failure is not by itself 
reason enough to conclude that there is inefficiency and hence there is scope for policy 
intervention. 
 
  A new angle on externalities was brought into the literature by Samuelson (1954, 1955, 
and 1958) in his seminal papers on public goods. Public goods are distinguished from private 
goods in that the consumption of the good by one agent does not subtract from the consumption 
of other agents.  This aspect is know as non-rivalry or nondepletable. A true public good also 
requires that it is not possible to limit the consumption of any particular good or person.  This 
condition is known as non-excludability. 
 
  It is generally recognized that left to its own devices the market will provide less than the 
socially optimal amount of a public good.  Each consumer's purchase of a public good provides a 
direct benefit not only to the consumer himself b ut also to every other consumer.  Private 
provision creates a situation where externalities are present. Because each consumer does not 
consider the benefits to others and because the opportunity cost of an additional unit is zero, 
since an additional unit consumed by one individual does not reduce the amount available for 
consumption by an other individual,  the payment offered to producers will not be sufficient to 
provide a socially optimal amount of the public good.  Furthermore, the non-excludability aspect 
of a pure public good creates a situation where consumers can free ride where each consumer has 
an incentive to enjoy the benefits of the public good provided by others while providing an 
insufficient amount himself. 
1 
 
  External effects impart 'publicness' to goods so that externalities are now associated with 
the nature or definition of public goods.  The pure public good is a polar case of an externality.  
In m ost cases externalities are felt and generated by numerous parties.  In the case of multilateral 
externalities the externality can either be described as depletable (rivalrous) or as non-depletable 
(non-rivalrous).  Depletable externalities have the feature that the experience of the externality by 
one agent reduces the amount that will be felt by other agents.  Nondepletable externalities have 
the characteristics of public goods because what is felt by one individual is not affected by the 
fact that other  individuals are experiencing it.  It is important to distinguish between depletable 
and non-depletable externalities because the mechanisms which can correct for market failures 
differ.  It can be argued that a decentralized market solution can be expected to work well for 
depletable externalities if enforceable property rights are assigned.  However, market based 
solutions are unlikely to work for nondepletable externalities.  
 
  The easiest type of externality to address, with a centralized or decentralized mechanism, 
is the bilateral externality.
2   With this type of externality the preferred approach is typically a 
                                                                 
1 Exclusion can strengthen the motives for production of a public good.  However, whether this effect is large 
enough to make the operation of a market possible is still open to debate.  Thompson (1968) argues that under 
provision may be mitigated. Oakland (1974) has argued for a presumption of under provision even when 
exclusion is possible. 
2 Unfortunately with bilateral externalities imperfectly competitive behaviour can result so that the Pareto  
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decentralized bargaining mechanism.  The introduction of additional agents creates problems as 
mechanism design has to be tailored to personalize markets.  In the case of the multilateral 
externality there were two types of external effects: depletable and nondepletable effects. If well-
defined and enforceable property rights can be specified over the externality and there are large 
numbers of both emitting and effected agents, so that price taking behaviour can be expected, 
then a socially efficient  solution can be negotiated for depletable externalities.  Nondepletable 
externalities introduce a public good aspect to the problem and the associated free rider problem.  
This problem precludes efficient negotiation of all mutually beneficial bargains.  A s a result 
purely market based solutions are unlikely to work in the case of a depletable externality. 
 
  Given adequate information centralized mechanisms which employ quotas or taxes may 
work to correct for nondepletable multilateral externalities.  But t he assumption that adequate 
information is available is very strong.  In practice the degree to which an agent is affected by an 
externality or benefits from a public good will only be known to that agent.  Information 
asymmetries will confound the assessment of appropriate tax or subsidy levels.  Mas-Colell, 
Whinston, and Green (1995) provide conceptual illustrations of why the asymmetric information 
will produce inefficient outcomes from the bargaining process.  They also compare the relative 
effectiveness of taxes and quotas.  The answer hinges on the distribution of the type of 
consumers and producers (where type depends on the degree that the individual agent is affected 
by the externality) which is only privately observed.  Given that the benefits and  costs of 
reducing externalities are unobservable, the parties involved may not have incentives to reveal 
them truthfully if asked.  The question is whether the government can design mechanisms where 
truth telling is a dominant strategy (in a game theoretic sense).  The answer is that the mechanism 
design which makes truth telling a dominant strategy can be prohibitively expensive.   
 
  All of the potential corrective mechanisms require that the externality generating 
mechanism be measurable.  However, this m ay not be technology feasible and even if it is the 
measurement may be prohibitively expensive.  Given the costs of measuring the externality and 
the expense of measuring the costs and benefits to both the affected parties and externality 
generators, it may be optimal simply to allow the externality to persist. 
 
  At the broadest level  externalities cover all instances of general interdependence in the 
economy.  Envy and altruism are legitimately classified as externalities but is it reasonable to 
ascribe m arket failures to these emotions.  The concept of an externality is broader then the 
category of market failures. Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962 p.p. 208-209) state that "(t)he 
observation of external effects, taken alone, can not provide a basis for judgment concerning the 
desirability of some modification in an existing state of affairs.  There is not a prima facie case 
for intervention in all cases where an externality is observed to exist".  Cornes and Sandler (1996 
p. 64) observe that "(i)t can be instructive to pay careful attention to the attractions and 
limitations of alternative institutional frameworks for delivering goods and services, rather than 
to start with the assumption that because of certain well-established inefficiency theorems pure 
public goods pose intrinsic problems.  To ignore this choice may overlook a vital dimension of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
optimal solution may not be practical.  
 
16
the problem, and in view of the widespread assumption that such situations justify government 
intervention". 